Game Analysis on Urban Rail Transit Project Under Governmental Investment Regulation

Urban rail transit is the construction project under the planning and huge investment of the government. How to effectively conduct investment regulation and control becomes the core question that the government departments are concerned about. In this paper, the relations among government, owner and contractor are studied and the static and dynamic game model is built for behaviors among each subject from the perspective of governmental investment regulation through game theory. Game analysis result shows:(1)the lower the governmental regulation cost the heavier the government's punishment for the owner due to its fail in due diligence and the more the owner's possibility of strict scrutiny;(2)the higher the owner's examination the less willing the owner to conduct narrow examination and the more contractor’s possibility to choose fraudulent conducts;(3)In case of higher income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and lower cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor can adopt collusion strategy while the government can adopt regulatory strategy. In case of lower income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and higher cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor should not adopt collusion strategy while the government should adopt regulatory strategy. The research result provides theoretical basis for the government to formulate relevant policies for investment regulation of urban rail transit project.

This creative work has been published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) license which allows copying, and redistribution as well as adaptation of the original work provided appropriate credit is given to the original author and the conditions of the license are met.