Evolutionary Game Analysis For Rent-seeking Behavior Supervision Of Major Infrastructure Projects Based On Prospect Theory

Major infrastructure projects (MIPs) possess significant strategic positions in the national economy and social development. However, recently, the rent-seeking behavior between supervision units and project contractors has intensified in project construction. This paper aims to study the behavior decision-making of stakeholders in rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs. In the complex and uncertain environment of MIPs, game players have cognitive bias and value perception preference. Therefore, this study introduced prospect theory and constructed the perceived return matrix and evolutionary game model of MIP rent-seeking behavior supervision among project owners, supervision units, and project contractors. From the perspective of risk perception theory, the reasons for the behavioral tendencies of game participants and the conditions for the steady state of strategy selection were explored through system dynamics simulations. The results showed that the stable state of the optimal strategy in the rent-seeking behavior supervision system of MIPs is related to the cognitive bias of the game players and is influenced by the level of regulation cost, the intensity of punishment and the size of accident losses. The contribution of this study lies in providing theoretical basis and decision support for constructing a long-term preventive mechanism for rent-seeking activities in MIPs.