The Conditional Limitation of Relational Governance: The Moderating Role of Project Complexity

Relational governance is generally concerned with the framework of project governance. However, this governance still has its limitations, which vary depending on contextual factors. Using transaction cost economics theory, this study considers project complexity as the moderator in studying the influence of trust as the most representative factor of relational governance in project performance. Empirical analysis with 302 owners and general contractors as a sample reveals that trust can effectively improve project performance and has a negative correlation with opportunism. The influence path of “trust–opportunism–project performance” is emphasized. The test of moderating effects shows that high project complexity increases the governance effectiveness of competence-based trust on project performance but weakens the governance effectiveness of goodwill-based trust on project performance. At the same time, high project complexity increases the governance effectiveness of goodwill-based trust on opportunism but weakens the governance effectiveness of competence-based trust on opportunism. The conclusion of this work can be used as a reference for the rational application of relational governance factors to various complex projects. This research also provides important inspiration for selecting appropriate relational governance directions to enhance project performance.

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