Behavior Analysis on the Security Object of the Public Rental Housing

With the establishment of the system of public rental housing supply, the vulnerable group would get great benefit in the promotion of social welfare, however, due to the existence of price gap and the imperfection of the public rental housing system, the game relationship formed between the management authority and the security object. Based on the definition to the security object in the public rental housing, the specific classification to the security object was analyzed at first, and then the motivation of the security object to obtain the unjust enrichment was discussed from the perspective of policy and the behavior. To stimulate the relationship and interaction between the management authority and the security object, a dynamic game model was presented in the context of basic hypothesis, the evolutionary strategy was summarized after the game process analysis. The possible paths to prevent from the behavior of free-riding of the security object was finally concluded.

This creative work has been published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) license which allows copying, and redistribution as well as adaptation of the original work provided appropriate credit is given to the original author and the conditions of the license are met.