Analysis of Social Capital and the Whole-Process Engineering Consulting Company’s Behavior Choices and Government Incentive Mechanisms—Based on Replication Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

Under the ‘PPP + EPC + whole-process engineering consultation’ mode, this article constructs a replication dynamic evolutionary game model of the main participants, namely, the government, social capital, and the whole-process engineering consulting company. In this paper, we analyze the evolutionary trajectory and evolutionary equilibrium strategy of tripartite interaction and three parties’ strategy choices under the influence of different parameters. Using the Python numerical simulation method to simulate the tripartite evolutionary paths under different parameters, this article finds the relationship between social capital, the whole-process engineering consulting company’s behavior choices, and government incentive mechanisms. There is a strong synergistic effect between the behavior choices of social capital and the whole-process engineering consulting company.

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