Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game
Auteur(s): |
Xuan Zhou
Dan Liu Chuanbin Yin |
---|---|
Médium: | article de revue |
Langue(s): | anglais |
Publié dans: | Advances in Civil Engineering, janvier 2021, v. 2021 |
Page(s): | 1-15 |
DOI: | 10.1155/2021/1805874 |
Abstrait: |
The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy. |
Copyright: | © Xuan Zhou et al. |
License: | Cette oeuvre a été publiée sous la license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0). Il est autorisé de partager et adapter l'oeuvre tant que l'auteur est crédité et la license est indiquée (avec le lien ci-dessus). Vous devez aussi indiquer si des changements on été fait vis-à-vis de l'original. |
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10646724 - Publié(e) le:
10.01.2022 - Modifié(e) le:
17.02.2022