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Research on Preventing Moral Hazard of Construction Project Based on Information Asymmetries

Auteur(s):

Médium: article de revue
Langue(s): anglais
Publié dans: The Open Construction and Building Technology Journal, , n. 1, v. 8
Page(s): 468-475
DOI: 10.2174/1874836801408010468
Abstrait:

There exists the problem of information asymmetry among the participants in construction project who form economic partnerships one another. Information asymmetries among the participants in construction project places a premium on adverse selection and moral hazard. The major objective of this article is to implement the mechanisms of incentive and monitoring under the framework of principal-agent theory in analysis of moral hazard of construction project and to explore how to prevent it. The optimization model of incentive and monitoring under the circumstance of asymmetric information will be founded on the basis of the analysis of the effect of incentive and monitoring mechanisms in the principal- agent relationship. It indicates that reliability of information can be increased when bringing incentive and monitoring mechanisms into reward contract, which can prevent moral hazard of construction project.

Copyright: © 2014 Pengcheng Xiang, Jinan Wang
License:

Cette oeuvre a été publiée sous la license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0). Il est autorisé de partager et adapter l'oeuvre tant que l'auteur est crédité et la license est indiquée (avec le lien ci-dessus). Vous devez aussi indiquer si des changements on été fait vis-à-vis de l'original.

  • Informations
    sur cette fiche
  • Reference-ID
    10384477
  • Publié(e) le:
    23.11.2019
  • Modifié(e) le:
    02.06.2021