Research on Cooperative Behavior of Green Technology Innovation in Construction Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game
Autor(en): |
Qing’e Wang
Wei Lai Mengmeng Ding Qi Qiu |
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Medium: | Fachartikel |
Sprache(n): | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht in: | Buildings, 21 Dezember 2021, n. 1, v. 12 |
Seite(n): | 19 |
DOI: | 10.3390/buildings12010019 |
Abstrakt: |
The dynamic evolution game model is built by using evolutionary game theory, and the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed by matlab2018b software in this paper. The cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism are comprehensively considered in this model, and numerical simulations of the influence of various influencing factors on the cooperation strategy selection of green technology innovation for construction enterprises are carried out. Then, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that the cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism have a significant impact on the cooperative evolution direction of green technology innovation for construction enterprises, separately. Stronger cooperation willingness or higher relative value of positive spillover, or reasonable income distribution can promote partners to adopt active cooperative strategies, while appropriately increasing punishment intensity can prevent opportunistic behaviors and improve the probability of success of cooperative innovation. |
Copyright: | © 2021 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. |
Lizenz: | Dieses Werk wurde unter der Creative-Commons-Lizenz Namensnennung 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) veröffentlicht und darf unter den Lizenzbedinungen vervielfältigt, verbreitet, öffentlich zugänglich gemacht, sowie abgewandelt und bearbeitet werden. Dabei muss der Urheber bzw. Rechteinhaber genannt und die Lizenzbedingungen eingehalten werden. |
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10648374 - Veröffentlicht am:
07.01.2022 - Geändert am:
01.06.2022